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It may seem an attractive proposal—
the Administration’s plan of using
projected budget surpluses to restore
Social Security’s finances—but it
obscures the real trade-off we face in
tackling this problem. The proposal is
essentially a change in the accounting
treatment of surpluses, deficits, and
debt held by the public and in the
Social Security Trust Fund. It would
in no way alter the fundamental
imbalance that afflicts the nation’s
most basic pension program.
On certain topics, confusion perpet-
ually reigns. Everyone has a personal
list, of course, but somewhere near
the top of most is what to make of 
any debate that includes the words
“Social Security.” As the seeds of
Social Security reform, planted in 
President Clinton’s January 1999 
State of the Union address, begin to
flower in the early heat of the political
spring, we can expect the surrounding
discussion to yield its fair harvest of
muddled thinking, mixed messages,
and mistaken claims.
One year earlier, the President proposed
that “we devote every penny of every
future surplus” to saving Social Security.
Although recent events in Yugoslavia
will inevitably dent the surplus projec-
tions calculated prior to the crisis in
Kosovo, the President’s recommenda-
tion remains the front-runner in the race
to address anticipated problems in
financing future Social Security benefits.  
This Economic Commentary evaluates
the Administration’s recent proposal to
restore solvency to the U.S. Social
Security system by using projected fed-
eral budget surpluses.1 Our central mes-
sage is quite simple: Such an action
may seem attractive, but it would
obscure the essential trade-offs that we
face as a society when addressing the
topic of Social Security reform. In par-
ticular, we note (as have others) that
proposals of this type are largely
changes in the accounting treatment of
surpluses and deficits. As such, they
cannot resolve the fundamental imbal-
ance in our most basic public pension
program. Ultimately, hard choices must
be made that involve either raising taxes
or cutting government expenditures.
n n   Some Simple Accounting: 
The Unified Budget
To make sense of a complicated pro-
posal, it always helps to strip the prob-
lem to its essentials. So we’ll construct 
a very simple example to illustrate the
relevant aspects of the accounting.
Here’s what we will assume:
n n   In the current period—let’s call it
“this year”—the government collects
$100 in payroll taxes (which are
labeled as contributions to the Social
Security system). In addition, the gov-
ernment collects another $100 in rev-
enue from sources other than payroll
taxes (the income tax, for instance).
n n   On the expenditure side, the govern-
ment requires $75 to pay this year’s
Social Security benefits, and $125 for
all other forms of spending.
So far, there is nothing too complicated
here. The government collects $200 in
revenues and has $200 of outlays. On
the basis of the unified budget—the
accounting convention that lumps
Social Security revenues and expendi-
tures with all other categories—the fed-
eral budget is in balance, with neither
deficit nor surplus.
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however, Social Security is consider-
ed an off-budget item. In our simple
example, it is the only such item, and
all other revenues and outlays are
termed on-budget.2 There are thus 
two sets of accounts. The deficit or sur-
plus of each is the difference between
the receipts and outlays for the cate-
gories of spending identified for that
account. In our example, the on-budget
account is in deficit by $25 ($100 of
income-tax revenues less $125 of non-
Social Security spending) and the off-
budget in a $25 surplus ($100 of payroll
tax receipts less $75 of Social Security
benefit payments).
n n    Surplus Mythology I
In principle, it would be possible to
completely separate the activities 
associated with the on- and off-budget
accounts. Those responsible for the 
on-budget account in our example
would simply issue enough debt to
cover the excess of expenditures over
receipts for the current period. In the
future, when the debt comes due, the
principal plus the interest would be 
paid out of income tax revenues. On 
the other hand, the surplus from the 
off-budget account would be used to
retire any accumulated off-budget 
debt or simply saved (in some form) 
to finance prospective shortfalls in 
off-budget receipts over outlays—that
is, shortfalls in financing the Social
Security system.
In practice, no such separation exists. In
the real world of U.S. fiscal policy, the
Social Security trust fund must invest in
Treasury securities—the debt issued to
cover on-budget shortfalls. Thus, the
appropriate concept is the unified bud-
get, which completely commingles the
on- and off-budget receipt and outlay
items. It is true that a paper transaction
occurs when taxes collected for Social
Security are used to finance general out-
lays; in effect, the Treasury gives the
Social Security accounts an IOU in
exchange for the surplus. However, it is
clear that nothing is made available to
finance future benefit payments but the
flow of prospective revenues on the
unified budget.
In our example, the Social Security
“trust fund” would receive an account-
ing entry indicating that payroll taxes of
$25 are being diverted to the on-budget
account. Presumably, this $25 will later
be repaid with interest to the off-budget
account, but where will the funds for
repayment come from? Unless the
Social Security system itself remains in
surplus, there is only one available
source: general revenues. In fact, this is
exactly what the Social Security Trust
Fund represents—an extension of the
tax base for financing Social Security
benefits to include income taxes. 
One might argue that this is entirely
appropriate. The extent to which future
Social Security benefits are paid for out
of future general revenues is limited to
the amount that contributors to the sys-
tem extend to pay for current govern-
ment spending. The problem with this
argument is that current government
spending largely represents current con-
sumption that is enjoyed by current gen-
erations. But future generations are the
ones that pay the taxes. In this case, pay-
ing future Social Security benefits to
today’s generations out of future general
revenue amounts to forcing future gener-
ations to finance today’s public goods
and services.
n n    Surplus Mythology II
This, then, is the main lesson of our
example: The device of the trust fund
simply permits current generations to
stake a claim on future generations’ gen-
eral tax payments while reaping the ben-
efit of current government spending on
public goods and services financed by
Social Security surpluses. The IOUs
from the Treasury to the trust fund repre-
sent nothing more than the promise to
pay for prospective Social Security ben-
efits from the income tax.
But how does this help us understand
proposals to restore solvency to the
Social Security system by using on-
budget surpluses? The answer is
straightforward. An IOU written to 
the Social Security Trust Fund repre-
sents exactly the same transaction
whether it derives from on-budget 
surpluses or off-budget surpluses. In
either case, it is just a promise to use
future general revenues.
To appreciate this point, consider a slight
variation of our previous example. In
particular, suppose that when “next
year” rolls around, the situations of our
first scenario are exactly reversed:
n n    Just as it did this year, the government
collects $100 in payroll taxes (desig-
nated as Social Security contribu-
tions) and $100 in income taxes. 
n n    On the expenditure side, the govern-
ment requires $125 to pay this year’s
Social Security benefits. Non-Social
Security expenditures are $75, but
IOUs to the trust fund require that 
$25 be transferred to Social Security
accounts. (For simplicity, we assume
that these IOUs bear no interest.)
As before, the unified budget is exactly
in balance: The federal government col-
lects $200 in revenues ($100 each from
the payroll and income tax) and has an
outgo of $200 ($125 for public pension
benefits and $75 in other expenditures).
The paper transaction of retiring the
IOUs from the income tax is precisely
the act of paying for promised benefits
from the income tax that we have been
emphasizing.
But now contemplate a situation in
which next year’s scenario is expected to
persist indefinitely. In that case, the
Social Security system is “broke”: The
contributions of workers (payroll taxes)
are forever insufficient to cover the
expected flow of Social Security bene-
fits. The rest of the government, how-
ever, is in surplus and (in our simple
example) by just the amount of Social
Security’s deficit. We can rectify this
problem in the Social Security system,
of course, by using on-budget surpluses
to pay Social Security benefits. But in
that event, all we’ll really have done is
raise the revenues received by the pub-
lic pension system by tapping the
income tax.
Our point is not that the decision to “set
aside” current and prospective surpluses
for paying future Social Security bene-
fits is irrelevant. In a world where inter-
est costs are non-zero, using surpluses to
retire debt rather than increase spendingor reduce taxes obviously decreases the
amount of revenues needed to service
that debt. This allows revenues to be
diverted for paying accumulated Social
Security liabilities, with no attendant
increase in overall revenue collection.
Still, the essential fact remains: The pol-
icy commits general revenues to pay for
pension entitlements. Exploiting unified
budget surpluses may make using gen-
eral revenues for Social Security easier
(and less transparent—after all, this par-
ticular solution requires no explicit
action to increase tax rates or cut bene-
fits), but doing so does not eliminate the
system’s prospective liabilities. In the
end, the policy represents a decision to
maintain the path of Social Security ben-
efits and pay for them out of future
income taxes collected by the federal
government.
n n    Surplus Mythology III 
(The Final Chapter)
Thus far, we have emphasized two
essential facts. First, when thinking
about the Social Security system and its
future, we should consider all potential
solutions in the context of the overall or
unified federal budget. Surpluses allo-
cated through the trust fund to future
benefit payments—whether they origi-
nate off- or on-budget—represent noth-
ing more than claims to future income
tax revenues. (Again, we are ignoring
the “privatization” elements of proposed
solutions.) Second, allotting additional
IOUs to the trust fund does not expand
the universe of policy actions available
for fixing Social Security. 
These facts about budget mechanics can
now be applied to the specific proposal
alluded to in President Clinton’s 1999
State of the Union address and de-
scribed in the budget for fiscal year
2000 (the implications of which are
shown in table 1). According to this
proposal, the nation would allocate 62
percent of prospective federal surpluses
to paying the Social Security benefits
promised under current law. The total
budget surplus projected over the next
15 years is $4.8 trillion. Of this, $2.1
trillion arises in the on-budget account. 
On the spending side, the Administra-
tion’s budget for fiscal year 2000 pro-
poses to allocate $1.4 trillion for addi-
tional on-budget initiatives: $481 billion
for defense spending, $536 billion for
establishing Universal Saving Accounts,
and $387 for associated financing costs.
In addition, $686 billion would be
devoted to funding Medicare benefits.
That is, the entire on-budget surplus over
the next 15 years is to be spent. 
The off-budget surplus of $2.7 trillion is
to be devoted to paying down debt held
by the public. Note, however, that this
surplus will generate additional IOUs
with the trust fund, committing future
general revenues to funding Social Secu-
rity benefits. It therefore amounts to sub-
stituting debt held by the trust fund for
debt held by the public. The Administra-
tion’s proposal to address prospective
Social Security shortfalls consists of 
a transfer, in addition to the allocations
mentioned above, of IOUs worth 
$2.8 trillion to the Social Security 
Trust Fund, thus increasing the commit-
ment of future general revenues for
Social Security. However, this transfer
only implies that general revenues
beyond the 15-year budget horizon
would be devoted to Social Security,
extending its financing to general rev-
enues after 2014. 
What to make of these numbers? First,
the Administration’s envisioned alloca-
tion of funds to finance future Social
Security benefits and other federal
spending programs will require tax
increases or other spending reductions
which are not yet articulated in current
laws or budget proposals. (The same
point has been made by several other
analysts.) Second, the proposal does not
represent a solution to Social Security’s
long-term imbalance in that it does not
alter any of the difficult choices (cutting
benefits or increasing taxes) that we, as a
nation, confront. 




Own surplus 2.1 2.7
Receipt/transfer from on-budget 2.8
Total sources 2.1 5.5
Uses
Transfer to off-budget 2.8
Pay off debt held by the public 2.7
Defense and other spending 
plus financing costs 1.4
Medicare spending 0.7
Total uses 4.9 2.7
Sources minus uses –2.8 2.8
SOURCE: Derived from Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 2000. Washington, D.C.:
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n n    Conclusions
Our intent in this Commentary has been
to illustrate that policies using unified
budget surpluses to finance the liabili-
ties of the U.S. Social Security system
would not produce any magic solutions.
In these policies, Social Security bene-
fits compete with all other legitimate
claims to federal revenues (including
taxpayers’ claims to simply have the
funds returned to them). There is no
such thing as a free lunch. The options
available to us remain the same as ever
and require making the same hard
choices. In the end, taxes must rise,
other government spending must fall, or
benefits must be cut. End of story.
Elsewhere, we advocate maintaining
the stream of promised benefits to
“older” generations and simultaneously
reducing the benefits of young and
future generations, coupled with
mandatory private saving plans.3 We
argue that this approach can be
designed in a way that assures retire-
ment security for younger generations,
given the benefit reductions or tax
increases that must inevitably be
imposed to bring the system into bal-
ance. Whether or not such a plan ulti-
mately emerges as a solution, in evalu-
ating alternatives it is crucial to
appreciate the very clear, very tough
trade-offs that we collectively confront.
n n    Footnotes
1. This refers to the total projected sur-
plus on the unified federal budget between
2000 and 2014. The President’s proposal
would allow the trust fund to invest a por-
tion of its holdings in equities and has called
for a bipartisan effort to provide additional
fiscal reforms.
2. In reality, the off-budget account in-
cludes the Postal Service Account. Because
this account is much smaller than Social
Security, ignoring it does not materially 
alter the analysis. 
3. See David E. Altig and Jagadeesh
Gokhale, “Privatizing Social Security: One
Plan,” Cato Project on Social Security Priva-
tization, no. 9 (May 29, 1997).